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Pioneer writers on close corporations' lamented the fact that corporation statutes
laid down, without differentiation, the same rules for publicly-held and close
corporations. They pointed out that the two are utterly different in their nature and
in their methods of operation and that concepts and rules suited to the governance
of the former are often ill-adapted to the latter. Accordingly, they suggested separate
legislation for close corporations--either a completely new statute specially drafted
for one-man, family, and other close corporations, or a statute based upon English
legislation providing for "private companies." 4
In spite of the vigor and skill with which these suggestions were presented, how-
ever, no jurisdiction in this country has enacted a comprehensive statute setting up
separate rules and regulations for dose corporations. As a matter of fact, the term
"close corporation" is not used at all in corporation statutes. A close corporation
is still formed under the same general incorporation laws as a publicly-held corpora-
tion, is taxed on the same basis, and in general must conform to the same require-
ments.
Nevertheless, most modern corporation statutes, especially those which have been
enacted or extensively revised since World War II, give an increased flexibility to
the corporate form and, to a considerable extent, permit a molding of the corporate
device to the needs of closely-held enterprises. Further, in a number of instances,
statutory provisions, albeit of rather limited scope, have been enacted with the
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primary objective of meeting one or more of the problems peculiar to close corpora-
tions; and although the provisions are not by their terms so limited in practical
,operation, they apply largely, if not exclusively, to close corporations. Mention
should also be made of the new North Carolina Business Corporation Act," whose
draftsmen, keenly aware of the peculiarities of close corporations, inserted numerous
provisions designed to meet their special needsT
This article discusses the provisions in modern corporation statutes which affect
close corporations, emphasizing legislative changes made during the last twenty years
or so. For this purpose, the legislation is grouped under the following headings:
(i) statutes giving the corporate form greater flexibility by authorizing the use of
optional charter clauses and special bylaw provisions; (2) statutes authorizing
unanimity or high-vote requirements for shareholder and director action; (3) statutes
permitting participants in a corporation to depart in various other respects from
the traditional pattern of stock corporation management; (4) statutes relaxing
the requirements of formal corporate meetings and of strict compliance with tra-
ditional corporate ritual; (5) statutes relating to problems of deadlock and dissolu-
tion; (6) miscellaneous statutory provisions peculiarly applicable to close corpora-
tions; and (7) legislation proposed but not yet enacted.
I
STATUTORY PRovIsIoNs AuTHORIZING OPTIONAL CHARTER CLAUSES AND
SPECIAL BYLW PROVISIONS
Most modern corporation statutes give a great deal of latitude-much more than
is generally supposed-to the lawyer who wants to mold the corporate form to a
5 The difficulty of defining the close corporation and drawing a sharp line between it and the
publicly-held corporation seems to account, in part at least, for the failure to limit the application of some
of the new statutes to close corporations. The New York Law Revision Commission, in reporting on
section nine of the New York Stock Corporation Law, infra note 29, stated: "No satisfactory way of
defining the genuine close corporation for purposes of a statute has been found. Economically, the dis-
tinction between a close corporation and any other is that in the close corporation management and
ownership are substantially identical, but the only way in which it appeared to the commission that a
definition could be embodied in a statute would be to limit the amendment to corporations having not
more than a stated number of shareholders, or not more than a stated amount of capital. This would
necessarily be arbitrary, might not provide an adequate answer to the economic problem, and would
possibly permit a single shareholder by splitting up his shareholding to break up the arrangement at
will unless the remaining shareholders or the corporation bought him out." N.Y. STATE LAw REvIsIoN
Cosat'N, REPORT 386 (1948).
Lowndes, Taxing the Income of the Close Corporation, A8 LAw & CoNTrtP. PRoa. 558, 582 (1953),
suggests (giving credit for this thought to Professor Elvin R. Latty) that it seems possible "to make
a distinction between those corporations whose stock is available to the public through a recognized
exchange, or in over the counter markets, and those whose stock does not appear in any recognized
market, or cannot be purchased without the consent of the corporate associates."
'N.C. GaN. STAT. c. 55 (Supp. 1955). For another recent statute taking a fresh approach to the
problems of close corporations, see P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 14, § x102 (c) (Supp. 1957) (providing for
special management arrangements in a corporation whose certificate of incorporation contains a provision
stating that it shall not have more than a specified number of shareholders, the number specified not
being greater than eleven).
'See Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.
L. REv. 432 (1956); Latry, Powers, and Breckenridge, The Proposed North Carolina Busines Corporation
Act, 33 N.C.L. REv. 26, 45, 51 (I954).
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particular business situation. They prescribe general rules for the organization, in-
ternal operation, and management of corporations-rules which apply in the absence
of a contrary arrangement among the participants; but by and large-though subject
to important exceptions in some jurisdictions-they give the participants considerable
freedom to regulate internal matters by either charter clause or bylaw provision or by
shareholders' agreement.
Almost all the corporation statutes authorize the use of optional charter clauses
and special bylaw provisions which supply the draftsman with varied and serviceable
materials for setting up a structure suited to the businessO Statutory support for such
clauses and provisions differs widely among jurisdictions, but the trend has definitely
been toward a broader and clearer authorization of the use of those which depart
from orthodox patterns.
A. Statutory Provisions Specifically Designating Optional Clauses and
Special Provisions
The number and nature of charter or bylaw clauses and provisions authorized
by statutory provisions of this sort traverse a broad range. In many states, only two
or three clauses and provisions, if any at all, are thus specified; and not uncommonly,
these are not the ones that are most needed in close corporations. Nevertheless,
among the clauses and provisions expressly designated in one or more jurisdictions
are some which can be exceedingly serviceable-such as those granting,9 defining,10
or enlarging" shareholders' pre-emptive rights to purchase new shares;' 2 those im-
posing restrictions on the transferability of stock;13 those requiring unanimity or a
high vote for shareholder or director action' 4 or requiring a high quorum for share-
holders' and directors' meetings;' those empowering a particular class or designated
classes of shares or securities to elect all or a specified number or proportion of the
directors;'" those empowering directors elected by the vote of a particular class or
designated classes of shares or securities to elect all or specified officers;' 7 and those
specifying that no shareholder shall own or vote more than an indicated percentage
of the corporation's stock.
8
8 See generally O'Neal, Molding the Corporate Form to Particular Business Situations: Optional
Charter Clauses, io VAND. L. Rlv. I (1956).
IE.g., CAL. CoRp. CODE S 305(b); PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 2582-204 (W) (1938).
10 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 26 (ig5i).
"E.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 12-3 (B)(1) (1950).
"The participants in a closely-held enterprise will often be interested in preserving or strengthening
their pre-emptive rights, because maintenance of their proportionate voting power and their proportionate
interest in corporate dividends and preservation of the bargained for divison of control may be of great
concern to them.
"E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2803 (F) (1949); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 4 (7) (i95i); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. c. I6, § 7 (1938).
"E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § IO2(b) (4) (1953); N.Y. STOCK CoRp. LAW § 9; W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 3o8 (j) (1955).
"E.g., N.Y. SToCK CoRp. Lw § 9; ORE. REV. STAT. 9H 57.165, 57.200 (i953).
"E.g., A. Rav. STAT. § 12:34 (D) (950).
"E.g., id. § 12:35 (E).
"E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2803 (E) (1949).
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B. Statutory Provisions Defining Applicable Rules in Absence of Other
Charter or Bylaw Coverage
Statutory provisions of this sort furnish support for a large number of charter
clauses and bylaw provisions. An examination of almost any modern corporation
statute will reveal numerous sections containing phrases which state that the regula-
tions laid down in the sections are to apply only in the absence of contrary provisions
in the charter or bylaws or which otherwise indicate that the subject mattter of the
sections may be regulated in the charter or the bylaws.?9 For example, the Illinois
Corporation Act provides as follows for charter or bylaw increase in the number of
directors required for a quorum or for director action:2°
A majority of the board of directors shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of
business unless a greater number is required by the articles of incorporation or the by-
laws. The act of the majority of the directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is
present shall be the act of the board of directors, unless the act of a greater number is
required by the articles of incorporation or the by-laws.
C. Statutory Provisions Broadly Authorizing Any Lawful Clauses and Provisions
Perhaps most helpful of all in supporting charter clauses and bylaw provisions
needed in close corporations are broadly-worded statutory provisions. At the be-
ginning of this century, the corporation statutes of a number of states contained a
section broadly authorizing the use of optional charter provisions.21 One of the
purposes of such a section was to enable those entering close corporations as minority
shareholders to protect themselves by insisting on appropriate safeguards against
increases in capital stock, increases in the number of directors, consolidations, and
other changes in the corporation's structure or management which might adversely
affect their rights.2 2
-lthe number of states with broad statutory authorization of optional charter
clauses has steadily grown, until at the present time, the corporation statutes of the
great majority, including all the more important commercial jurisdictions, contain
such a section. The pertinent section in the Delaware statute,2 3 which has identical
or quite similar counterparts in a number of jurisdictions, 4 is perhaps typical. It
states that the charter may contain:
19 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. C. 32, § 157.14, 157.J5, 157.24, 157-25, 157.26, X57.31, 157.33, 157.34,
157-37, 157-38, 157-40, x57.43 (1955).
"°Id. § 157.37- (Emphasis added.)
"See, e.g., Ala. Gen. Acts 1903, act 395, § 2 (j); N.Y. Sess. Laws 1895, c. 672, § io; N.C. Pub.
Laws, 1901, C. 2, § 8 (7); Va. Acts of Assembly, Extra Session 1902-04, c. 170, at 437. The National
Banking Act of 1864 also contained a provision of this kind. See Bullard v. Banks, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
589 (1874).
2 See Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 447-48, 98 N.E. 85% 856-57 (1912).
"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § IO2 (b) (s) (1953).
2
'See, e.g., ARK. STAT. § 64-101 (i) (1947); FLA. STAT. § 608.03 (x955); GA. Cona ANN. § 22-X082
(h) (Supp. 1956); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 4 (b) (9) (i95i); N.J. REv. STAT. § 14: 2-3 (1937).
N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 13 (2) provides that a corporation's certificate of incorporation may contain
"any provision for the regulation of its business and the conduct of its affairs, and any limitations upon
its- powers, or upon the rights of its stockholders or upon the powers of its directors and members,
which does not exempt them from the performance of any obligation of duty imposed by law."
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Any provision which the incorporators may choose to insert for the management of
the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provisions
creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors and
the stockholders, or any class of stockholders, or, in the case of a corporation which is to
have no capital stock, of the members of such corporation; if such provisions are not
contrary to the laws of this State.
Many corporation statutes also contain a section generally authorizing special pro-
visions in the bylaws. The language of these sections is similar to that of some of
the sections authorizing optional charter clauses. The Illinois statute, for instance,
provides that the bylaws "may contain any provisions for the regulation and man-
agement of the affairs of the corporation not inconsistent with law or the articles of
incorporation."2
Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear exactly what charter clauses and bylaw pro-
visions are sanctioned by these broadly worded statutes. In spite of the expansive
language in which these statutes are couched, courts have, on occasion, construed
them narrowly and have invalidated unorthodox charter clauses or bylaw provisions
on the ground that they are not authorized. 2 6 Therefore, some authors have
cautioned against reliance on these statutes.27 In view, however, of the general re-
pudiation of the old "concession theory" of corporate existence as inconsistent with
the facts of present-day corporate life and the acceptance of the idea that corporate
charters and codes of bylaws are primarily contracts among the participants in the
enterprises, courts are likely in the future to give a consistently broad and inclusive
scope to these statutory authorizations.
II
STATUTORY PRovisIoNs AUTHORuZING HIGH-VOTE REQUIREMENTS FOR
SHAREHOLDER AND DIRECToR AcTiON
Businessmen forming a close corporation often want a power to veto some or
all corporate policies and decisions. In particular, those who are to have minority
interests want protection against the broad powers normally vested in shareholders
and directors to determine corporate policy and to make decisions by simple majority
vote. This desired power frequently can be given by charter clauses or bylaw pro-
visions requiring unanimity or concurrence of a high percentage of voting units for
shareholder or director action. Similarly, that power can be given by high-quorum
requirement for shareholder and director action: whenever high-quorum require-
ments exist, a shareholder can prevent shareholder action by refusing to attend
shareholders' meetings and can prevent director action by keeping his representa-
tive-assuming he has one-away from directors' meetings.28
25 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 32, § 157.25 (955). See also Mo. Rav. SrAT. § 351.290 (1949).20For a discussion of some of the cases interpreting or applying the general statutes, see O'Neal,
supra note 8, at 5-19.
"See HENRY W. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § I6 (rev. ed. 1946); HENRY W. BALLANTINE AND
GRAHAm L. STEELiNG, JR., CALiFoRmIA CORPORATIONS LAWs § 37 (I949).
" The use of high-vote and high-quorum requirements to give shareholders a veto over corporate
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The statutes authorizing high-vote and high-quorum requirements in the charter
or bylaws fall within the broader category of statutes authorizing optional charter
clauses and special bylaw provisions, discussed in the preceding section. The
serviceability of these requirements in molding the corporate form to the needs of a
closely-held enterprise is so great, however, that perhaps attention should be par-
ticularly called to typical statutes supporting them.
Undoubtedly the best known of statutory provisions authorizing high-vote and
high-quorum requirements is section nine of the New York Stock Corporation Law,
enacted originally in 1948 and since amended several times. 0 It expressly provides
that the certificate of incorporation can set up high-quorum requirements for share-
holders' meetings and for directors' meetings and can require unanimity or a high
vote for shareholder or director action. Section nine was enacted on the recom-
mendation of the New York Law Revision Commission to overcome difficulties
created for the close corporation by the famous decision of the Court of Appeals of
New York in Benintendi v. Kenton HoteI. ° There, the court held invalid bylaws
requiring unanimity for shareholders' resolutions, the election of directors, and
directors' resolutions. The reasoning of the court, viz., that the requirements violated
statutory norms and that one of the bylaws-the last-was inconsistent with the
stautory' scheme of corporation management, was broad enough to invalidate
the requirements even had they been in the certificate of incorporation rather than
in the bylaws. At the time of its passage, section nine was praised as the first im-
portant legislative recognition of the distinctive management needs of close corpora-
tions.!1
Although section nine is the statutory provision most often discussed, most states,
in fact, now have enacted similar legislation authorizing high-vote and high-quorum
requirements for shareholder action, for director action, or for both 2 An illustrative
statutory authorization of charter clauses requiring a high vote for shareholder
action is the following widely-prevalent provision:
33
Whenever, with respect to any action to be taken by the shareholders of a corporation,
the articles of incorporation require the vote or concurrence of the holders of a greater
proportion of the shares, or of any class or series thereof, than required by this Act with
respect to such action, the provisions of the articles of incorporation shall control.
action' is discussed in some detail in O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions:
Use of Special Charter and By-Law Provisions, 18 LAw & CoNraMP. PRoB. 451 (1953).
" N.Y. STocK CORP. LAw § 9.
so294 N.Y. 112, 6o N.E.2d 829 (1945).
" de Capriles and Reichardt, 1947-1948 Survey of New York Law-Corporation, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REV. 747 (1948).
" The statutes are discussed in O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions:
Use of Special Charter and By-Law Provisions, x8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 451, 457-60 (1951).
"
1 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 32, § 157.146 (x955); Mo. Rav. STAT. § 351.270 (1949); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act,
art. 9.08 (1956); VA. CODE § 13.1-33 (Supp. 1956); MODEL BusiNEss CORPORATON ACT § 136. See also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-66 (Supp. 1955); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.52 (Page Supp. 1956).
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And modern corporation statutes commonly authorize charter clauses or bylaw pro-
visions requiring a high vote for director action as well by stating that:34
The act of the majority of the directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is present
shall be the act of the board of directors, unless the act of a greater number is required
by this chapter, the articles of incorporation or the bylaws.
III
STATUTORY PROVISIONS PEEmiTrING DEPARTURE FROM TRADITIONAL
MANAGE[ENT PATrTENS
The participants in a close corporation often want to depart from the traditional
framework of corporation management and to work out among themselves the
allocation of control of the business. Although they value the limitation of personal
liability the corporate form furnishes, they may want to retain all the freedom of part-
ners in determining who is to control the enterprise and how that control is to be
exercised. As has often been noted, shareholders in a close corporation not un-
commonly desire to be shareholders to the outside world, but partners among them-
selves.
The high-vote and high-quorum requirements discussed in the part immediately
preceding are departures from the traditional control pattern. But that is only one
of the approaches that can be taken to the task of providing the management
pattern desired by the participants3 5 Another approach is indicated through varia-
tions in the corporation's share structure in the way shares are allocated. In most
jurisdictions, statutory provisions governing stock classification and charter clauses
on stock and financial matters give the draftsman considerable leeway in this
regardP' In preparing the stock and financial clauses, the draftsman is not re-
stricted to bare recitals of specified items; he has a wide choice as to the content
and wording of the clauses he uses. Thus, by classifying shares, using nonvoting
shares or shares with limited voting rights, varying other rights and preferences of
the different classes of shares, and carefully parceling out the various classes of
shares, almost any desired distribution of control can be obtained.
A third approach that can be followed to effect the desired distribution of control
in a close corporation is the use of so-called irrevocable proxies: some of the partici-
pants give proxies on some or all of their shares to other participants, empowering
the latter to vote the shares for a specified period of time or on stated contingencies.
The difficulty with this approach is that in many jurisdictions, there is doubt as to
whether proxies for this purpose can be made irrevocable. In general, courts have
applied the rules of agency to proxies; and, therefore, in the absence of statute,
proxies are usually held to be revocable, unless they are coupled with an interest, and
"'E.g., ILL. IREv. STAT. C. 32, § 157-37 (I955); O0o REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.62 (Page Supp.
3956); iVs. STAT. § 180.35 (1955); MODEL Busmrss CORPOATION Ac § 37.
" See Ballard. Arrangements for Participation in Corporate Management Under the Pennsylvania
Business Corporation Law, 25 TEmp. L.Q. 131 (1951).
O See, e.g., N.Y. STocK CorP. LAw § ix.
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this is so even though they are in express terms stated to be irrevocable3 7 Further,
the concept "coupled with an interest" has proved vague and unhelpful. The courts,
on some occasions, have sustained irrevocable proxies in close corporations,8" and on
other occasions, they have held the proxies to be revocableY0 On the whole, statutes
dealing with proxies have done little definitely to settle the question of when-
i.e., under what circumstances-and for how long a proxy can be made irrevocable.40
In 1953, New York enacted a statutory provision which represents an ambitious
effort to draw a clear-cut line between revocable and irrevocable proxies. It provides
that a proxy which is entitled "irrevocable proxy" and states that it is irrevocable is
irrevocable when it is held by one of the following or his nominee :
4
(a) a pledgee under a valid pledge;
(b) a person who has agreed to purchase the stock under an executory contract of sale;
(c) a creditor or creditors of the corporation, other than a banking corporation, who
extend or continue credit to the corporation in consideration of the proxy if the
proxy states that it was given in consideration of such extension or continuation of
credit, the amount thereof, and the name of the person extending or continuing
credit;
(d) a person who has contracted to perform services as an officer of the corporation,
other than a banking corporation, if such a proxy is required by the contract of
employment, as part of the consideration therefor, if the proxy states that it was
given in consideration of such contract of employment, the name of the employee
and the period of employment contracted for.
The statutory provision, however, goes on to remove the attribute of irrevocability
as soon as the proxyholder ceases to need protection, by providing that the proxy
42
becomes revocable after the pledge is redeemed, or the executory contract of sale is
performed, or the debt of the corporation is paid, or the period of employment provided
for in the contract of employment has terminated, and becomes revocable, in a case pro-
vided for in paragraph (c) or (d) of this section, at the end of the period, if any,
specified therein as the period during which it is irrevocable, or three years after the date
the proxy was given, whichever period is the lesser, unless the period of irrevocability
is renewed from time to time by the execution of a new irrevocable proxy ...
Further, the statute states that a provision making a proxy irrevocable is not en-
"it; re Chilson, i9 Del. Ch. 398, x68 Ad. 82, 85 (Ch. [933); State ex rel. Breger v. Ruschc, 219
Ind. 559, 39 N.E.2d 433 (1942); Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MICH. L. REV. 225, 256 (1942).
" See, e.g., Smith v. San Francisco & N. Pac. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (897): Ecclcstone
v. Indialantic, Inc., 319 Mich. 248, 29 NAV.2d 679 (947); State ex rel. Everett Trust & Savings Bank
v. Pacific Waxed Paper Co., 22 Wash. 2d 844, 157 P.2d 707 (1945).
So See, e.g., Johnson v. Spartanburg County Fair Ass'n, 210 S.C. 56, 41 S.E.2d 599 (947); Roberts
v. Whitson, 188 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
"' Many statutes simply state that a proxy shall not be valid after a specified period of time, unless
a longer period is provided for in the proxy. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (1953) (three
years, unless proxy provides for a longer period); MoDEL BUSINESS CORPORAflON Aar § 3 (eleven
months, unless otherwise provided in the proxy). They do not indicate clearly whether a proxy can
be made irrevocable. N.C. GEN. STAy. § 55-68(b) (Supp. 1955) provides that "no proxy, whether or not
coupled with an interest or otherwise irrevocable by law, shall be valid after io years from the date
of its execution."
"N.Y. STOCK Cons'. LAw § 47-a.
A Ibid.
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forceable against a purchaser of stock without actual notice of the provision, unless
notice of the proxy and its irrevocability appears on the certificates representing the
affected shares.
Unless a proxy complies fully with the terms of this statutory provision, it will
be held to be revocable,43 despite the fact that under decisions in some other juris-
dictions, the particular proxy might be classified as one coupled with an interest. In
other words, the New York statutory provision is a two-edged sword-validating
some irrevocable proxies, but invalidating others.
Perhaps the most popular approach to the problem of distributing control in close
corporations is through a shareholders' agreement. No attempt will be made here
to enumerate and discuss the numerous considerations that may influence the de-
cision of a court passing on the validity and enforceability of a typical shareholders'
control agreement. Suffice it to say, a high percentage of such agreements contain
provisions which are of doubtful validity under the judicial precedents.
The first legislative step to bolster shareholders' agreements and to draw a clear
line between valid and invalid agreements was taken in the new North Carolina
Business Corporation Act, which contains, among other things, the following pro-
visions :4
I. An otherwise valid contract between two or more shareholders that the shares
held by them shall be voted as a unit for the election of directors shall, if in
writing and signed by the parties, be valid and enforceable as between the
parties, but for not longer than ten years from the date of its execution.
2. Except in corporations whose shares are generally traded in the markets, no
written agreement to which all the shareholders of a corporation have actually
assented, whether embodied in the charter or bylaws or in any side agreement in
writing and signed by all the parties, whether it relates to the management of
the corporation's business or division of its profits or to any other phase of its
affairs, shall be invalid between the parties on the ground that it is an attempt
by the parties to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or to arrange
the parties' relationships in a manner that would be appropriate only between
partners.
3. An agreement between all or less than all of the shareholders, whether solely
between themselves or between one or more of them and a party who is not a
shareholder, is not invalid as between the parties on the ground that it so relates
to the conduct of the affairs of the corporation as to interfere with the discretion
of the board of directors; but (with control properly comes responsibility)
the making of such an agreement imposes upon the shareholders who are
"N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 19 (3) ("Every proxy shall be revocable at the pleasure of the person
executing it, except as othenvise provided in section forty-seven-a of the stock corporation law."); In re
Norton & Schneider, Inc., 137 N.Y.S.ad 269 (Sup. Ct. x954) ("irrevocable proxy' given by one
shareholder to another to vote stock in an election of directors held invalid).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (Supp. 1955). See also P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 14, § 1102 (c) (Supp.
1957) (providing for special management provisions in the certificate of incorporation).
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parties thereto the same liability for managerial acts that is imposed by other
provisions of the statute on directors.
Many of the successful attacks on control arrangements departing from the orthodox
pattern of corporation management have been based on the argument that such
arrangements violate the statutory norm conferring on the board of directors power
to manage corporate affairs.45 The North Carolina statute precludes that ground of
attack. In addition to the third provision above, the statute contains a section ex-
pressly stating that the norm of director-control shall be subject to modifying pro-
visions in the charter, bylaws, or shareholders' agreements, which reads in part as
follows:46
Subject to the provisions of the charter, the by-laws or agreements between the share-
holders otherwise lawful, the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a
board of directors.
The section goes on to provide, however, that no limitation upon the authority
which the directors would have had in the absence of the limitation is effective
against persons without actual knowledge of it4 7
IV
STATUTORY PRovisIoNs RELAXING REQUIntEMENTS OF STRICT OBSERVANCE OF
CoRPoRm FORMALIT
Corporate rituals and the traditional formalities of corporate operation are often
not observed in close corporations. Further, as shareholders and directors are
usually the same people, it is not uncommon for the participants to fail to differenti-
ate between what they do as shareholders and what they do as directors. Bylaw re-
quirements are quite often flouted; and, indeed, in some parts of the country, many
small close corporations do not have bylaws or even minutes books. There may be
a fragmentary file of corporate minutes, but that file will frequently be limited to
copies of a few resolutions, such as those required by banks for the opening of
checking accounts and those required for the passage of tide to real property.
According to traditional corporation doctrine, neither shareholders nor directors
can act except at duly called meetings.48 The courts, however, have repeatedly
relaxed the traditional rule in order to sustain informal action taken by participants
in close corporations. For instance, they have held that whenever the affairs of a
corporation are customarily carried on through informal conferences, decisions
reached by all the directors and shareholders at an informal conference bind the
"'See, e.g., Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 6o N.E.2d 829 (1945); Manson v.
Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (i918).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-24(a).
'TId. § 55-24(b).
HENRY W. BALLANTINE, CostPoxAoNs §§ 44, 170 (rev. ed. 1946). Notice of a special directors'
meeting must be given to a minority director, even in a close corporation. Lycette v. Green River
Gorge, Inc., 21 Wash.2d 859, 153 P.2d 873 (1944).
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corporation 4 9 Nevertheless, the rule requiring formal shareholders' and directors'
meetings poses a serious risk to the validity of action informally taken in a close
corporation.
In response to persistent demands from practicing lawyers and organizers of
closely-held enterprises, the legislatures are gradually relaxing the traditional re-
quirements of formal corporate meetings. Some modern corporation statutes permit
both shareholders and directors to act informally and without a meeting by signing
a written consent. 0 Under these statutes, however, unanimity is necessary; all the
shareholders or directors, as the case may be, must sign for the written consent to be
effective.' Other statutes expressly permit the shareholders to act by written con-
sent, but do not contain authorization for the directors to act in that way,52 thus
implying that the directors cannot act informally.
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Legislative recognition of the informality of corporate meetings is also reflected
in a section contained in a number of the new corporation statutes-e.g., the Vir-
ginia54 and Texas statutes5 -- which states that notice of a directors' meeting may be
waived after the meeting. This type of statutory provision affords a method for un-
tangling some of the legal snarls that may result from the failure to hold proper
meetings.
The new North Carolina Business Corporation Act may well set a pattern for
future legislation. It contains elaborate provisions validating informal action by
shareholders and directors, provisions avowedly drafted with the needs of the close
corporation in mind. Since it may furnish the guide for draftsmen of other states
on the subject of informal corporate action, its pertinent provisions are set forth here
in full.
Section 55-29 of the Act provides:
Informal or irregular action by directors or committee.-(a) Action taken by a majority
of the directors or members of a committee without a meeting is nevertheless board or
committee action if:
" Brainard v. Dc La Montanya, 18 Cal.2d 502, 511, 116 P.2d 66 (1941); First Nat'l Bank v.
Frazier, 143 Ore. 662, 19 P.2d io9i (1933); Miller v. South Hills Lumber & Supply Co., 334 Pa. 293,
6 A.2d 92 (1939); National Bank v. Puget Sound Biscuit Co., 61 Wash. 192. 112 Pac. 265 (I91O).
See also Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the One- or Two-Man Corporation, 34 N.C.L. REV. 471,
475 (1956).
" E.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 30I.26(11), 301.28(7) (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 5 2852.-402(5)
(Supp. 5956); vis. STAr. § i80.9i (1955).
" The Ohio statute permits informal action by shareholders or directors, but authorizes "contrary"
provisions in the articles or the regulations. Osso Ray. CoDE ANN. § 1701.54 (Page Supp. 1956). The
view has been expressed that the draftsmen of the statute, in referring to contrary provisions, had in
mind provisions limiting shareholder and director action to action taken as a group at a formal meeting,
and that they did not intend to permit the participants to provide in the articles or the regulations for
action without a meeting upon the written approval of less than all of the shareholders or directors. See
Dampeer, General Corporation Law and Non-Profit Corporation Law, 16 Omo ST. LJ. 446, 480 (1956).
"
2 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (953); MODEL BusINEss CoRPoRATIoN AcT § 138.
" In jurisdictions in which the board cannot act by written consent, inconvenience to the whole board
can sometimes be avoided by setting up an executive committee with authority to act for the board.
Many corporation statutes contain a provision expressly authorizing creation of an executive board.
" VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-27 (Supp. 1956).
5 5 TEx. Bus. Conr. AcT art. 9.09 (1956).
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(i) Written consent to the action in question is signed by all the directors or members
of the committee, as the case may be, and filed with the minutes of the proceedings of
the board or committee, whether done before or after the action so taken, or if
(2) All the shareholders know of the action in question and make no prompt objection
thereto, or if
(3) The directors or committee members are accustomed to take informal action and
this custom is known to all the shareholders and if all the directors or committee mem-
bers, as the case may be, know of the action in question and no director or committee
member makes prompt objection thereto.
(b) If a meeting of directors otherwise valid is held without proper call or notice,
action taken at such a meeting otherwise valid is deemed ratified by a director who did
not attend unless promptly after having knowledge of the action taken and of the im-
propriety in question he files with the secretary or assistant secretary of the corporation his
written objection to the holding of the meeting or to any specific action so taken.
Section 55-63 of the Act provides:
Irregular meetings; action without meetings.-(a) The transaction of any meeting
of shareholders, however called and with whatever notice, if any, are as valid as though
had at a meeting duly held after regular call and notice, if:
(i) All the shareholders entitled to vote are present in person or by proxy and no
objection to holding the meeting is made by any shareholder, or if,
(2) A quorum is present either in person or by proxy and no objection to holding
the meeting is made by anyone so present, and if, either before or after the meeting, each
of the persons entitled to vote, not present in person or by proxy, signs a written waiver
of notice, or a consent to the holding of the meeting, or an approval of the action taken as
shown by the minutes thereof. All such waivers, consents, or approvals shall be filed with
the corporate records or made a part of the minutes of the meeting.
(b) The absence from the minutes of any indication that a shareholder objected to
holding the meeting shall prima facie establish that no such objection was made.
(c) Any action which, under any provisions of this chapter, may be taken at a meeting
of the shareholders, may be taken without a meeting if consent in writing, setting forth
the action so taken, shall be signed by all of the persons who would be entitled to vote
upon such action at a meeting and filed with the secretary of the corporation as part
of the corporate records. Such consent shall have the same force and effect as a unanimous
vote of shareh6lders, and may be stated as such in any certificate or document filed with
the" Secretary of State under this chapter.
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STATUTORY PRovIsIONS RELATING TO PROBLEMS OF DEADLOCK AND DissoLuTioN
A. Statutory Provisions Permitting Special Contractual Arrangements for
Corporate Dissolution
Dissension among the shareholders falls with a heavy impact in a close corpora-
tion. A large part of the assets of some or all of the shareholders may be tied up in
the.company, and salaries received from employment by the company may furnish
their principal livelihood. Not uncommonly, each of the shareholders is guaranteed
membership on the board of directors and a particular office by a shareholders' agree-
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ment. As the shareholders are active in the business, they are in constant contact
with each. Because of this intimacy, once dissatisfaction or distrust has developed,
friction is likely to continue to grow.
In the dose corporation, the relationship between the participants, like that
among partners, is one which requires close cooperation and a high degree of good
faith and mutual respect; but, when these conditions are absent, a participant does
not have a partner's power to dissolve the business unit and get out.56 At the same
time, the "way out" which is open to a shareholder in a publicly-held corporation,
too, is not available to a participant in a close corporation. In a publicly-held corpora-
tion, a shareholder who is dissatified with the way in which the corporation is being
operated can sell his shares at no great financial loss; but shares in a close corpora-
tion cannot be so easily disposed of. Anything less than a controlling interest in a
close corporation does not have a ready market; and, if there is dissension in the
corporation, a minority interest is likely to appear even less inviting to a prospective
purchaser. Further, if there are restrictions on the transferability of shares, as is
often the case, an irritated and obstinate associate is in a position to prevent the
sale of the shares.
Whenever a shareholder in a close corporation wants to get out but cannot dispose
of his shares without heavy financial loss, there often develops a state of affairs which
is sometimes referred to as a "stalemate.""7 A dissatisfied shareholder's service may
be necessary for the efficient operation of the business, or he may be frozen into the
directorate and into an officership by a shareholders' agreement or other control
arrangement. But in exasperation, he may consistently refuse to cooperate with his
associates; in fact, he may do whatever he can to obstruct the operation of the
corporation's affairs. The strife among the participants not infrequently results in
incessant litigation and perhaps even in physical violence. 8  This state of affairs,
of course, harms the enterprise and results in serious losses to all shareholders.
But perhaps even more serious, "deadlocks" frequently occur among the share-
holders and in the directorates of close corporations. The distribution of voting
shares in close corporations is often such that an eventual impasse is possible or even
probable. Such, for example, may be the case where the shares are equally divided
G1'A partner may bring about the dissolution of the firm at any time. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIp
Act §§ 31(i)(b) (dissolution without violation of the partnership agreement by "the express will of any
partner when no definite or particular undertaking is specified"), § 3T(2) (dissolution in contravention
of the agreement by the express will of any -partner at any time). See also id. § 32, providing that on
application by or for a partner, "the court shall decree a dissolution whenever: (a) A partner has been
dcclared a lunatic in any judicial proceeding or is shown to be of unsound mind, (b) A partner becomes
in any other way incapable of performing his part of the partnership contract, (c) A partner has been
guilty of such conduct as tends to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business, (d) A partner
wilfully or persistently commits a breach of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself
in matters relating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the
business in partnership with him, (e) The business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss,
(f) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable."
7 See Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, i9
U. Cm. L. Rav. 778, 781 (952).
" See, e.g., Stott Realty Co. v. Orloff, 26z Mich. 375, 247 N.W. 698 (1933); Nashville Packet Co.
v. Neville, 144 Tenn. 698, 235 S.W. 64 (1921).
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between two shareholders or groups of shareholders. Again, wherever directorates
have an even number of members-not an uncommon occurrence-even divisions
among the directors may well arise. Further, those who are to hold minority in-
terests in closely-held enterprises, in an effort to protect themselves against the power
normally vested in shareholders and directors to determine corporate policy and
to make decisions by simple majority vote, often bargain for and obtain a veto over
corporate policies and decisions. The granting of veto powers to some or all of the
shareholders, of course, also greatly enhances the risk of corporate paralysis. In the
colorful language of a Virginia court, these veto arrangements enable a recalcitrant
shareholder or director to "embalm his corporation and hold it helpless ... in a state
of suspended animation."5
It may be advisable, therefore, in some close corporations, to set up special pro-
visions for dissolution in the charter or bylaws or in a shareholders' agreement.
Each shareholder might be given the power, similar to that of a partner, to obtain
the dissolution of the concern at will, or if he first offers his shares to the other share-
holders at a predetermined price and they do not purchase. Or provision might be
made for compulsory dissolution of the corporation on the occurrence of specified
events--e.g., the death or disability of any shareholder or of a particular shareholder,
or the failure of the corporation to pay dividends in a specified amount for a named
period of time. Another provision that might be useful in a shareholders' agree-
ment is one binding all the shareholders to vote their shares for dissolution if a
deadlock develops among the shareholders or directors and persists for a stated
period of time, or if the terms of the directors expire and for a designated time
the shareholders are unable to elect new directors.
On the other hand, provisions might also be included to make dissolution more
difficult than it would otherwise be. For instance, a unanimous vote of the share-
holders might be required for dissolution to protect minority shareholders against
the possibility of a freeze-out in which majority shareholders would obtain the dis-
solution of the corporation and then take the business and its assets into another
company in which the minority shareholders would have no interest.
There is serious doubt whether special dissolution arrangements will be given
effect in jurisdictions where statutes fixing the shareholder vote and spelling out
procedures for dissolution are couched in language that may be interpreted as
mandatory. In the few instances in which a special dissolution provision has been
challenged, however, it has been sustained by the courts. Thus, a Georgia court
sustained a contract by which a shareholder promised to vote his stock for dissolu-
tion in consideration of another shareholder's undertaking to reimburse the promissor
if the amount the promissor received from the liquidation was less than the sum he
originally paid for his shares60 And an agreement among the two shareholders of
" Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893, 896-97 (1944).
" Wolf v. Arant, 88 Ga. App. 568, 77 S.E.2d x16 (x953). Sce also Simonson v. Helburn, 97
N.Y.S.2d 4o6 (Sup. Ct. 1950). But ci. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 273 App. Div. 918, 77 N.Y.S.2d 682
(2d Dep't 1948), afl'd mem., 298 N.Y. 787, 83 N.E.2d 473 (1948).
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a corporation prohibiting either from bringing about the dissolution of the corpora-
tion except in ways specified in the agreement was given effect by a Massachusetts
court, even though a statute provided that a corporation or its members might file
for dissolution under circumstances different from those set forth in the agreement. 6 -
The new North Carolina Business Corporation Act is designed to dispel any
doubt about the validity of contractual arrangements for dissolution. That statute
authorizes judicial liquidation of a corporation in an action by one of its share-
holders whenever it is established that all of the shareholders 2
... are parties to, or are transferees or susbcribers of shares with actual notice of a written
agreement, whether embodied in the charter or separate therefrom, entitling the com-
plaining shareholder to liquidation or dissolution of the corporation at will or upon the
occurrence of some event which has subsequently occurred.
Query, however, whether this statute authorizes a court to enforce an agreement
making dissolution more difficult to accomplish than it would otherwise be, and to
refuse dissolution, otherwise called for, on the ground that it would be contrary
to the agreement among the participants.
Some of the statutory materials authorizing unanimity or high-vote requirements
for shareholder and director action6" would probably support charter clauses or
special bylaw provisions giving shareholders a veto over decisions to dissolve by
requiring unanimity for dissolution. Further, Iowa has a statute which states
specifically that a corporation may be dissolved "in accordance with the provisions
of its articles"; 4 and Massachusetts has one which provides that the agreement of
association may contain a provision for the corporation's voluntary dissolution.65
B. Dissolution-on-Deadlock Statutory Provisions
Many jurisdictions, including practically all the more important commercial and
industrial states, have statutory provisions specifically authorizing corporate dissolu-
tion in situations of deadlock in director or shareholder voting. There is consider-
able variation among these jurisdictions in the statutory language and some differ-
ences in the kinds of deadlock situations covered. The statutes discussed in the
following paragraphs perhaps illustrate most of the variations.
The New York statute66 authorizes dissolution in the following situations:
"Leventhal v. Atlantic Finance Corp., 316 Mass. 194, 55 N.E.2d 20 (1944).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(3) (Supp. 1955).
CS See supra 345-47.
CCIOWA CODE § 491.23 (1954). As statutory provisions setting a particular shareholder vote for
dissolution are designed to protect the shareholders, rather than the public generally, a strong argument
can be made that even without specific statutory authorization, the shareholders can waive, limit, or
contract away their rights under those statutes. See Annot., 154 A.L.R. 269, 270 (1945). For a dis-
cussion of New York statutes relating to dissolution and of the possibility of restricting the statutory
right of the holders of a majority of the shares to seek a voluntary dissolution, see Note, r SYRAcusE L
REV. 489 (1950).
"MAss. ANN. LAWs c. 156, § 6(h) (1948).
8 8 N.Y. GaEN. CORP. Lw § 103. See generally on deadlock-dissolution problems in New York,
Comment, 50 CoLum. L. REv. OO (195o); Note, 27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 300 (1952); Burstein, The
Dissolution of Closed Corporations, 123 N.Y.L.J. 1464, 1484, 1504 (April 26-28, 595o).
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x. A corporation has an even number of directors who are equally divided re-
specting the management of its affairs.
2. The votes of a corporation's stockholders are so divided that they cannot elect
a board of directors.
3. A corporation's certificate of incorporation requires a vote for director action
greater than otherwise would be required by law, and the directors are divided
respecting the management of the corporation's affairs in such a way that the
requisite number of votes for action by the board of directors cannot be obtained;
or a corporation's certificate of incorporation requires a stockholder vote for
election of directors greater than otherwise would be required by law, and the
votes of the stockholders are so divided that the requisite number of votes for
election of directors cannot be obtained.
An important restriction on a court's right to dissolve under the New York statute is
that it must appear that the dissolution will be beneficial to the stockholders and not
injurious to the public.07 This requirement has been applied by the Court of Appeals
to deny dissolution of a deadlocked corporation if it is operating profitably. 8
The deadlock statute in a number of states provides for dissolution whenever
it appears that09
... the directors are deadlocked in the management of corporate affairs and the share-
holders are unable to break the deadlock, and that irreparable injury to the corporation is
being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof.
The Illinois statute authorizes dissolution on that ground or on the ground, which
was added to the statute in i95i , that70
... the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and have failed, for a period which
includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors
whose term has expired or would have expired upon the election of their successors.
This ground for dissolution, in that it propounds a standard that is definite and yet
gives the participants a reasonable time to settle their differences, affords a sensible
and workable basis for dissolution, and it is encouraging to note this ground is
gaining widespread acceptance.71
67N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAv § 117; In re Seamerlin Operating Co., Inc., 307 N.Y. 407, 121 N.E.2d
392 (1954); In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. i, xsg N.E.2d 563 (1954); Application of
Cantelmo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1st Dep't 1949) (dissolution will not be granted as
beneficial to stockholders where petitioner is seeking to oust other stockholder from the business); In re
Norton & Schneider, Inc., 137 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (court recognized that its refusal to dissolve
meant that the corporation would have to function for an indefinite time with a holdover board because
the shares were evenly divided and could not elect a new board, but it denied dissolution because
there had been no showing that dissolution would benefit the shareholders).
"I1n re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. i, rig N.E.2d 563 (1954).
"
9 E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. C. 32, § 157.86 (a) (r) (1955); Mo. Rzv. STAT. § 351.485 (1949); PA.
STAT. tit. 15, §§ 2852-ir07 (A) (4) (1938). Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-242 (6) (1948) (the "share-
holders or directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs, and the corporation is
suffering or is about to suffer, irreparable injury by reason thereof").
OILL. REV. STAT. c. 32, § 157.86 (a) (2) (1955).
"Among the corporation statutes which contain a provision of this kind are: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
125 (a) (2) (Supp. 1955); WIs. STAT. § 180-771 (1) (a) (4) (1955).
CLOSE CORPORATIONS
The California statute72 authorizes a court to entertain proceedings for the invol-
untary winding-up or dissolution of a corporation on any one of a number of grounds
including the following:
i. The corporation has an even number of directors who are equally divided
and cannot agree as to the management of its affairs, so that its business cannot
longer be conducted to advantage or so that there is danger that its property or
business will be impaired and lost.
2. The holders of the voting shares of the corporation are so divided into fractions
that they cannot agree upon or elect a board of directors consisting of an uneven
number.
3. There is internal dissension and two or more factions of shareholders in the
corporation are so deadlocked that its business cannot longer be conducted with
advantage to its shareholders.
Most of the deadlock statutory provisions dearly cover a situation in which a
board with an even number of members divides equally and the shareholders cannot
resolve the deadlock by election of a new board because the shares are evenly
divided between two shareholders or two factions. Some of the statutes, however,
apparently do not authorize the dissolution of a corporation which is deadlocked
because the charter or bylaws of the corporation require unanimity or a high vote
director or shareholder action and no faction can get the necessary vote; or, if they
do authorize dissolution in such a situation, they do not permit a shareholder with
relative small holdings to bring the petition. Thus, the Massachusetts statute73 does
not permit a petition for involuntary dissolution to be filed on the basis of deadlock
except by the holder or holders of not less than forty per cent of the corporation's
stock, and then only if the votes of the corporation's board of directors and of its
stockholders
. .. are equally divided on a question affecting the general management of the affairs of
the corporation, or if the votes of its stockholders are equally divided in the election of
directors, and there appears to be no way of reaching an agreement and breaking such
deadlock.
On the other hand, some statutes are broad enough unequivocally to authorize
dissolution where deadlock is brought about through the operation of high-vote or
high-quorum requirements.
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C. Statutory Provisions Allowing a "Buy-Out" As Substitute for Dissolution
A few states have statutory provisions which empower majority shareholders,
whenever dissatisfied minority shareholders bring a suit for the dissolution or
winding up of the corporation, to avoid the dissolution by purchasing the shares of
the dissatisfied shareholders at their fair value, as determined by a prescribed pro-
71 CAL. CORP. CODE § 4651 (b-d).
'MIAss. ANN. LAWS c. 155, § 50 (1948). See also N.J. REv. STAr. § 14:13-15 (Supp. 1955).
7
"MINN. STAT. § 301.49 (4) (1953); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § x03.
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cedure 5  This buy-out provision is desirable, because it permits majority share-
holders to preserve the enterprise as a going business and, at the same time,
guarantees a dissatisfied shareholder a fair price for his holdings.
Perhaps dissolution-on-deadlock statutory provisions could be improved by speci-
fying that whenever a deadlock results from the operation of high-vote or high-
quorum requirements for shareholder and director action, rather than from an equal
division of shareholders and directors, majority shareholders will have an option to
purchase the minority shareholders' interest at a price determined in a specified way.
As a matter of fact, consideration might well be given to provisions empowering
each shareholder or faction in a corporation deadlocked by an even division to set
a value on a half-interest in the enterprise, which the opposing parties would then
have to give for the offeror's interest or accept for their own interest.
VI
- MISCELLANEOUS STATUTORY PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO CLOSE CORPORATIONS
A. Texas Statutory Provision Dealing With Restrictions on the Transferability
of Shares
Participants in a close corporation often want the power to choose their future
business associates. That power is commonly given to them by placing restrictions
on the transferability of the corporation's shares of stock. By far the most popular
restrictions in this country are the so-called "first option," which gives the corporation
or the other shareholders first refusal of the shares of a holder who decides to sell
and sometimes an option to purchase the shares of a holder who dies or leaves the
employment of the company; and buy-and-sell arrangements, which require the
estate of a deceased shareholder to sell and the corporation or the surviving share-
holders to buy the deceased's interest in the company.
As a general proposition, the courts, in the absence of statutory provisions to the
contrary, sustain restrictions which they think are "reasonable" in the light of all
the circumstances of the particular casetm irrespective of whether the restrictions are
in the charter, the bylaws, or a shareholders' agreement. With very few exceptions,
the courts have upheld first options and buy-and-sell arrangements. Under the Uni-
form Stock Tranfer Act,77 however, a restriction will not be given effect, at least
as to purchasers without knowledge of it, unless it is stated on the share certificates
affected.
A section of the new Texas Business Corporation Act is unique, in that it attempts
a legislative statement on the validity of share transfer restrictions. In general, the
statutory provision follows the rules laid down by the judicial decisions and the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act. It provides first that a corporation7 s
" CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5228 (I949); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 4658-59; NV. VA. CODE ANN. § 3093 (1955).
" See Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 745 (948); O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held
Corporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HARtv. L. REV. 773, 777-784 (1952).
'7UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 15.
1
'TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.22 (1956).
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... may impose restrictions on the sale or other disposition of its shares and on the transfer
thereof, which do not unreasonably restrain or prohibit transferability, if each such re-
striction is expressly set forth in the articles of incorporation or by-laws of the corpora-
tion and is copied at length on the face or so copied on the back and referred to on the
face of each certificate representing shares ...
It then goes on to state that in addition to any other restrictions which may reason-
ably be imposed on the transfer of its shares by any corporation under the above
provision, the following restrictions may be imposed:"
(i) Restrictions reasonably defining pre-emptive or prior rights of the corporation
or its shareholders of record to purchase any of its shares offered for transfer.
(2) Restrictions reasonably defining rights and obligations of the holders of shares
of any class, in connection with buy-and-sell agreements binding on all holders of shares
of that class, so long as there are no more than twenty holders of record of such class.
(3) Restrictions reasonably defining rights of the corporation or of any other person
or persons, granted as an option or options or refusal or refusals on any shares.
The following points about the Texas statute should be particularly noted. First,
it limits the use of buy-and-sell agreements to classes of stock which are held by
twenty persons or less. Query, whether this limitation is desirable as a matter of
policy; the use of buy-and-sell agreements to restrict classes of stock which are
widely-held may lead to complications, but whether a buy-and-sell agreement is
to be used in any particular situation might well be left to the business judgment
of the persons involved. Second, its wording raises some doubt whether restrictions
other than buy-and-sell arrangements are valid if placed in a shareholders' agreement,
rather than in the charter or bylaws. Third, it does not attempt to settle the
question of whether "consent restraints'--i.e., restrictions requiring the approval
of the directors or the shareholders for a transfer of shares-are "reasonable" and,
thus, valid. Fourth, it does answer one question that has perhaps never been
settled by the cases-namely, whether first options on shares may be granted to
persons other than the corporation or its shareholders; the answer is in the affirma-
tive.
B. Statutory Provisions Empowering Directors to Fix Their Own Compensation
as Directors and Officers
One of the most difficult problems in a close corporation is to find a method of
fixing executives' compensation which will not later be subject to attack. As ma-
jority shareholders in a close corporation are usually its controlling directors and
principal officers, a disinterested quorum of directors to pass resolutions on execu-
tives' salaries often cannot be obtained.
In 1951, Wisconsin enacted what was then unique legislation designed to solve
the problems involved in fixing the compensation of corporate officers and execu-
70 Ibid. Subject to minor changes in capitalization and punctuation, the language which follows
in the text is that of the statute.
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tive employees when those officers and employees constitute a majority of the board
of directors80 In brief, the directors are given the power to establish reasonable
compensation for officers and employees, irrespective of any personal interest of
the directors. In 1955, a similar statutory provision was adopted in Ohio.8 1 The
Wisconsin statute reads in full as follows:
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws, the board of
directors, by the affirmative vote of a majority of the directors then in office, and irre-
spective of any personal interest of any of its members, shall have authority to establish
reasonable compensation of all directors for services to the corporation as directors, officers
or otherwise, or to delegate such authority to an appropriate committee. The board of
directors also shall have authority to provide for or to delegate authority to an appropriate
committee to provide for reasonable pensions, disability or death benefits, and other bene-
fits or payments, to directors, officers and employees and to their estates, families, de-
pendents or beneficiaries on account of prior services rendered by such directors, officers
and employees to the corporation.
Note that the statute clearly states that the compensation must be reasonable. The
proponents of this legislation contend that while a shareholder can still bring a suit
based on the claim that director-employees are engaging in self-dealing in fixing
their own compensation, the result reached in the litigation will turn on the reason-
ableness of the director-employees' compensation, and not on a technical defect in the
corporate action fixing the compensation8 2 The second sentence in the Wisconsin
statute was designed to answer any doubt of the power of the directors to grant
reasonable benefits or additional compensation to executives or other employees based
on their past services, or to grant pensions or allowances to the widows or dependents
of executives or other employees.
VII
LEGISLATION PROPOSED BuT NOT ENACTED
Perhaps a few words should be said about legislative proposals which have
been advanced recently with problems of special importance to close corporations in
mind, but which thus far have not been enacted. Two proposals have been made
with a view to protecting minority shareholders against self-serving and selfish action
by majority interests. A bill introduced in New Jersey a few years ago would have
limited the discretion of the board of directors by requiring a declaration of divi-
dends whenever the earned surplus of a corporation having one class of stock be-
comes "greater than ten times the par value of its capital stock issued and outstand-
ing, or ten times the amount subscribed for and paid in on the capital stock of the
company if the same be of no par value," unless holders of two-thirds of the shares
W's. STAT. § 180.31 (1955).
s Oxno REv. CoDE ANN. § i7oI.6o (Page Supp. 1956).
82See comments of the draftsmen in the accompanying annotations. Ibid. See also Dampcer, supra
note 51, at 481.
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consent to the withholding of dividends. This would have enabled minority share-
holders who could muster the votes of over one-third of the shares to defeat schemes
by majority interests designed to freeze-out the minority by withholding dividends
indefinitely, while perhaps paying comfortable compensation to majority share-
holders in officerships.
The new North Carolina Business Corporation Act, as originally proposed, con-
tained a subsection, omitted in the statute as finally enacted,"4 which afforded a
remedy to minority shareholders if the controlling shareholders should try to dilute
the proportionate interests of the minority by causing new shares to be issued at less
than their value to themselves or their relatives or friends. 5 Pre-emptive rights,
even assuming that they have not been denied by special charter or bylaw provision,
do not always protect minority shareholders against that possibility, because new
shares may be issued, perhaps designedly, at a time when minority shareholders
cannot finance their acquisition of new shares. The subsection omitted from the
North Carolina statute provided expressly that a pre-emptive offer to a shareholder of
his pro rata part of new shares or treasury shares would not deprive him of a cause
of action based on the issuance of the shares at a price which unfairly diluted his
holdings, if there was no ready and adequate market for the sale of his rights under
the offer and if he notified the corporation in writing that he was financially unable
to accept the offer and that he believed the offering price to be so low as unfairly
to dilute his holding. The subsection went on to provide that in an action of this
type, evidence tending to show prior efforts to induce the shareholder to sell his
shares to directors, officers, or dominant shareholders of the corporation would put
upon the defendant or defendants the burden of proving that the offering price was
fair.
The proposal that would have perhaps the most significant effect of all on close
corporations, were it to be adopted, is the one that would treat close corporations
as partnerships for income tax purposes. Professor Charles L. B. Lowndes argues
convincingly that in dose corporations, the separate corporate entity should be dis-
regarded and the shareholders taxed directly upon their distributive shares of the
corporate income in the same way that the income of a partnership is taxed to the
partners86 Somewhat along these lines, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, at the
time it was introduced, contained a-provision which would have permitted, subject
S' . 273 (x955), discussed in Note, io RurroaRs L. RMv. 723 (1956). An earlier New Jersey statute
contained language which seemed to require dividend payments by the directors, but Stevens v. United
States Steel Corp., 68 N.J. Eq. 373, 59 Ad. 905 (Ct. Err. & App. 19o5), imposed limiting conditions
which rendered the provision ineffective, and it was later repealed. A number of states now have or
have had legislation similar to the old New Jersey statute. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 5r, § 3-16
(1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-115 (1950), abrogated by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(j) (Supp. x955).
"' S. 49, § 55-46 (h) (955).
" For a discussion of freeze-outs of minority shareholders by the bad faith issuance of additional
shares, see Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 271 (1957).
" Lowndes, supra note 5, at 581. Proposals to class small corporations as partnerships for income
tax purposes were made as early as 1928. See Weiner, supra note 2, at 283-84.
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to certain conditions and limitations, a close corporation to elect to be taxed as a
partnership; s7 but that provision was eliminated in the conference committee.
8
CONCLUSION
Many, if not most, modern corporation statutes are sufficiently elastic in their
provisions that informed lawyers can mold the corporate device to meet the prin-
cipal needs of a closely-held enterprise, although careful planning and resourceful
and imaginative drafting are essential to accomplish that objective. Further, a num-
ber of statutes of limited scope have tackled problems which are peculiar to, or at
least most acute in, close corporations, and the prophecy can safely be made that
there will be an even greater legislative recognition of close corporations problems
in the future89
This legislative recognition probably will not take the form of a separate statute
laying down comprehensive regulations applicable solely to close corporations. Per-
haps a separate statute would be undesirable, in that it would tend to discourage
the expansion of close corporations into publicly-held ones. In any event, most
members of the corporate bar seem to be opposed to a separate statute. Future de-
velopments in statutes affecting close corporations rather may well follow the inno-
vations in the new North Carolina Business Corporation Act. Draftsmen charged
with revising the corporation laws of other states should seriously study that imagina-
tive and carefully-drafted legislation.
The taxation of close corporations on the same basis as partnerships would
eliminate some of the tax-avoidance schemes now so widely prevalent and would
permit many corporate decisions which are now based primarily on tax considera-
tions to be made solely on the basis of business considerations. That change also
might encourage the initiation and growth of small enterprises. Eventual modifica-
tion of the tax laws to tax close corporations as partnerships is a distinct possibility.
All in all, the steady growth in the number of statutory provisions favorable to
close corporations and the prospect of additional and perhaps more rapid develop-
ments in the future demonstrate that the labors of the pioneer writers, who pleaded
so eloquently for legislative recognition of the distinctive needs of close corporations,
have not been entirely in vain.
-Senate Committee on Finance, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, S. REP. No. 1622, 83 d Cong., 2d Sess.
118-19, 452-58 (1954). See also Haddad, Organization and Operation of Corporations, 43 ILL. B.J.
547 (1955).
a' Conference Committee, Internal Revenue Code of 5954, H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 72(1954)-
oIncidentally, there are many signs of an increased judicial recognition of the special problems of
close corporations. For judicial developments, see Scott, Developments in Corporate Laws, 12 BusItNESS
IAWYER 438, 439-46 (1957).
